That by which a thing is known rightly is called pramana, i.e., valid knowl­edge. On the rise of valid knowledge doubt, illusion and ignorance are removed and the nature of a thing is known or understood rightly to a considerable extent. So valid knowledge is regarded as pramana. Having mown a thing rightly, man decides to attain it, if it is desirable and to abandon it, if it is undesirable.

There are two types of valid knowledge, viz., direct and indirect. Ob-ects, viz., colour, etc., are cognised through sense-organs, viz., eye, etc., assisted by mind. To be more explicit, colour or form is seen by the eye, flavour is grasped by the tongue, odour is smelt by the nose, touch is cognised by the skin, and the sound or word is heard by the ear. All these are the cases of perception. But they are the cases of sense-perception. The experience of pleasure, etc., generated by mind is mental percep­tion.

The above-mentioned perceptions are called empirical perception. Each of them the sense-perceptions and mental perception passes through four gradual stages, viz., avagraha (grasping), ihd (cogitation), avdya (defi­nite judgement) and dhdrand (retention). First there arises the general non-detailed knowledge of the object through sense-organs and mind. It is called avagraha (grasping). Then there takes place cogitation with respect to the very object with a view to arriving at definite judgement. This cogi­tation is called iha. It is followed by the definite judgement called avdya. The consolidation or continuance of the judgement to such an extent that in future it may cause memory is a case of dhdrand.

Seeing a tall thing like a tree from a distance is avagraha (grasping). [This is followed by a query or doubt: 'Is this a man or a stump of a tree?' the doubt which urges the cogniser to cogitate on the basis of specific features in order to arrive at a definite judgement. This cogitation is a caseof iha. After cogitation, there arises a definite judgement like 'This is certainly a man'. This is called avaya. This determinate knowledge stays for some time. But afterwards, when the mind withdraws itself from its object and directs its attention to some other object, this determinate knowledge disappears, but it leaves behind its impressions. These impres­sions are such that in future on certain occasion they give rise to the memory of the thing determinately known in the past. The stream of judgement (determinate knowledge) continuously flowing for some time, the resultant emergence of mental traces and the recollection in future of the determinately known thing in the past all these three operations of matijndna constitute dhdrand. But it is noteworthy that recollection or memory falls in the class of indirect pramdna (valid knowledge) and not in that of direct pramdna.

These four gradual stages, viz., avagraha, etc. occur in each of the five sense-perceptions as also in the mental perception.

The perception-type which is different from the empirical perception, does not depend on sense-organs and mind, but depends solely on the spiritual power is called transcendental perception. Thus transcendental perception is derived directly from the self. It is not dependent on the j services of the sense-organs and mind. The following three varieties fall in the category of transcendental perception. They are avadhi (direct perception of temporally and spatially remote material things), manahparydya (direct perception of mental states of other persons) and kevala (perfect eternal perception omniscience). Avadhi is found in all infernal and celestial beings from their very birth while human and animal beings attain it as a result of the spiritual practice of the ethical vows, self-imposed wholesome restrictions, etc. Manahparydya manifests itself in on those human beings who are greatly self-controlled and saintly. jnana is the perfect, eternal and infallible knowledge.

The Jaina view regarding the sense-object contact in the generation < sense-perception is as follows:

When we taste the flavour with our tongue, our tongue is in dip contact with the flavour. When we grasp the touch of a thing, our skin is in direct contact of the thing. When we smell the odour, our nose is invariably in direct contact with the odorous substances. Even when we grasp the odour of a thing, which is considerably far away from us, our nose does have direct contact with the odorous subtle particles that proceed from the thing and reach the nose. When the sounds or words coming from a long or short distance strike the ear, we hear them with our ears. According to the jaina view, words are the aggregates of the material atoms that have acquired capacity to convert themselves into speech. For the Jainas, therefore, the word or sound is a substance. Thus the tongue, the skin, the nose and the ear—these four sense-organs cognise their respective objects after having come in direct contact with them. But it is quite obvious that the things whether distant or near do not go near the eyes when they are seen with the eyes. This means that the eye perceives them without having come in direct contact with them.1 So the Jainas call the eye 'aprapyakari'. The term 'aprdpyakdn means 'that sense-organ which cognises its object {kdn) without reaching it (aprdpya), that is, without coming in its direct contact.' Indirect valid-knowledge has five varieties, viz., memory, recognition, cogitation, inference and verbal testimony.